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THE INTERNET OF THINGS: WHERE PRIVACY AND 
COPYRIGHT COLLIDE 
 
Lidiya Mishchenko† 
Our Internet of Things (“IoT”) devices are constantly monitoring our 
every move, collecting sensitive data about us in a way that we do not 
fully appreciate. Manufacturers of these devices have a huge financial 
incentive to collect as much data on us as they can, and to use and 
sell this data in its most identifiable form. Yet our privacy regulations 
currently provide no real checks on how data is collected and used by 
these companies. Furthermore, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”) actually creates a substantial roadblock in this instance, 
preventing users and the government from ever finding out what data 
is collected and how it used by device manufacturers. To create some 
transparency in this system, the DMCA should be amended to include 
a limited circumvention exception for privacy. The proposed 
exception attempts to incentivize above-board behavior by device 
manufacturers, while allowing the government’s chief privacy 
agency, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), to have at its 
disposal the tools and resources required to investigate improper 
practices. Under this proposal, the FTC can help create binding 
industry standards for data collection and dissemination, aligning the 
DMCA with the goals in our privacy regulations and filling in the 
regulatory gaps our current privacy laws leave for IoT device 
manufacturers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
You wake up. Your wearable device tells you that you did not 
sleep very well. You see that your first meeting got pushed back 
forty-five minutes and that your alarm let you sleep an extra fifteen 
minutes. You walk into the kitchen where the coffee, triggered by 
your alarm, has already been brewed. Your fridge tells you that 
you’re low on milk and that more has been ordered online. After 
breakfast, you head to your car. As you leave, the lights in your 
apartment go off automatically and the temperature is lowered. Your 
car is already warmed up enough to melt the ice off of the windshield. 
The car tells you how to avoid the accident on your route and reminds 
you to call your mom.1 
But this idyllic world is interrupted when you arrive at work and 
find out, while reading an internet blog, that all the activities you have 
been manually inputting into your wearable device are now available 
online for everyone to see. Apparently, the device company has made 
such data public by default. Some of those activities you input were 
sexual in nature. This has quickly turned into a nightmare—your boss 
reads the same blog! And unfortunately, this last part of the story is 
 
 1. This example is loosely based on Cisco’s Blog post from 2011. See Dave Evans, The 
internet of Things, CISCO BLOG (July 15, 2011), http://bit.do/CiscoIoT.  
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not science fiction. In 2011, Fitbit users found out that the sexual 
activity records of approximately 200 customers were showing up in 
Google search results.2 Fitbit quickly remedied the problem, but no 
one can really erase the embarrassment those users must have felt. 
We live in a world surrounded by devices that monitor our every 
move. These devices can connect to the internet and thus coordinate 
with one another, creating the Internet of Things (“IoT”).3 They 
provide enormous benefits and efficiency, but they also completely 
shift our concept of privacy. Wearable devices in particular raise new 
privacy concerns. Senator Chuck Schumer warned that wearable 
devices such as Fitbit are “a privacy nightmare” because they collect 
such sensitive information as GPS location and sleep patterns, which 
can then be sold to third parties.4  
Fitbit has in the past responded to scandals in a timely fashion. 
On the same day as Senator Schumer’s statement, Fitbit updated its 
privacy policy stressing that the company does not sell data that can 
be used to identify its users.5 Chuck Schumer responded by saying 
that Fitbit is doing “exactly the right things” with its updated privacy 
pledge.6 Despite Chuck Schumer’s retreat and Fitbit’s expedient 
response, Fitbit and wearable devices like it may still pose a “privacy 
nightmare” for consumers. Although the company has revised its 
privacy policy, explaining that it only “share[s] or sell[s] aggregated, 
de-identified data that does not identify you,” there is still plenty of 
room for concern. Fitbit collects all sorts of data—some data you 
provide yourself and other data the device measures on its own, e.g., 
with accelerometers.7 Fitbit devices collect data about your location, 
the number of steps you take, your weight, height, gender, and how 
you sleep.8 This type of data can be used to figure out, for example, 
your gait, which is completely unique to you, when you take the bus 
or ride a bike,9 your mood,10 or if you might be pregnant (sometimes, 
 
 2.  Kashmir Hill, Fitbit Moves Quickly After Users’ Sex Stats Exposed, FORBES (July 5, 
2011), http://bit.do/ForbesFitbitStatsExposed.  
 3.  Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 88–89 (2014). 
 4.  Lance Duroni, Fitbit Doing ‘Right Thing’ With Privacy Policy, Schumer Says, 
LAW360 (Aug. 25, 2014), http://bit.do/FitbitRightThing.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7.  Privacy Policy, FITBIT (Dec. 9, 2014), http://bit.do/FitbitPrivacyPolicy; Fitbit Help: 
How does my tracker count steps?, FITBIT (Oct. 26, 2015), http://bit.do/FitbitHelpTrackerCount. 
 8.  Fitbit Help, supra note 7. 
 9.  Peppet, supra note 3, at 129–30. 
 10.  Id. at 115. 
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even before you know).11 This data is invaluable, both to companies 
like Fitbit, and to third parties that buy such data.12 And there is a 
strong incentive for Fitbit not to aggressively de-identify its data: the 
less anonymous the data is, the more valuable it is.13 
For example, imagine Fitbit sells only your accelerometer data to 
a third party. Even if Fitbit removes all “identifying information,” 
such as your name and address, a company may still be able to couple 
this data with other publicly-available data, like your public social 
media profiles, to identify you. Many entities such as insurance 
companies, advertisers, and possibly even your future employers have 
incentives to re-identify de-identified data.14 Even techniques such as 
data aggregation, depending on how it is accomplished, can allow for 
re-identification.15  
What happens if you try to find out what data is being collected, 
or if it is accurate? Fitbit is better than most companies in that 
sense—it lets you export your fitness data and says “[y]ou own your 
data.”16 But what about your Fitbit’s raw accelerometer data, which, 
for example, allows for identification of your unique gait pattern? 
Fitbit doesn’t allow you to access this output data.17 In some ways, 
your Fitbit, and other wearable devices, are black boxes. You don’t 
know what’s being collected or how that data is being analyzed, 
aggregated, or sold.  
The “nightmare” doesn’t end there. Not only are there concerns 
that wearable devices like Fitbit may evade current privacy 
regulations,18 copyright law poses an additional obstacle to 
transparency. The data and software of wearable devices are protected 
 
 11.  See Amanda Jackson, Husband and wife never expected their Fitbit would tell them 
this ..., CNN (Feb. 11, 2016), http://bit.do/FitbitPregnancy. 
 12.  PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE FTC REP. 38 
(2012), http://bit.do/FTCProtectingConsumer [hereinafter 2012 FTC REPORT] (discussing the 
fact that restricting data collection “risk[s] undermining companies’ incentives to innovate and 
develop new products and services to consumers”). 
 13.  Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010) (“Data can be either useful or perfectly 
anonymous but never both.”). 
 14.  See Salvador Ochoa, Reidentification of Individuals in Chicago’s Homicide 
Database: A Technical Legal Study (May 5, 2001) (unpublished student paper, M.I.T.), 
http://bit.do/ReidentificationIndividuals (listing motives for identification). 
 15.  Ohm, supra note 13, at 1756. 
 16.  Fitbit Help: Can I export my fitness data to my computer?, FITBIT (Mar. 2, 2016), 
http://bit.do/FitbitHelpExportData. 
 17.  Dan Chen, Product Development: Web API: Get the raw accelerometer data, FITBIT 
COMMUNITY DISCUSSION FORUM (July 17, 2014), http://bit.do/FitbitCommunityRawData. 
 18.  Peppet, supra note 3, at 117–47 (discussing unique privacy regulation problems that 
IoT devices present). 
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by technological protection measures (“TPMs”).19 These TPMs are 
often used by companies to protect user privacy, but are also used to 
protect the company’s intellectual property,20 and may even be used 
by companies to limit consumer choice in the aftermarket,21 or even 
to hide wrongdoing.22 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”) generally makes it illegal to circumvent these TPMs.23 
Thus, Fitbit could theoretically sue you for hacking one of their 
devices, even if you were only trying to figure out what the device 
was measuring and what data was being stored.  
Given the enormous financial incentive for Fitbit and other IoT 
device companies to collect, use, and sell our personal data, we need 
some way of making sure these companies are protecting our privacy. 
This article proposes a revised privacy circumvention exception to the 
DMCA that may help keep these companies in line. Part I of this 
article explains the current legal shortcomings with regulating the IoT 
in the privacy space. Part II details how the DMCA and copyright 
further inhibit our ability to regulate IoT devices. It also explains how 
the DMCA currently addresses privacy. Part III discusses the proper 
place for the DMCA in the privacy space and proposes legislative 
amendments to the DMCA that would improve our ability to regulate 
how IoT devices collect and use our personal data.  
 
 19.  Terms of Service, FITBIT (Oct. 28, 2015), http://bit.do/FitbitTOS (discussing 
“technological measure[s] implemented by Fitbit or any of Fitbit’s providers … to protect the 
Fitbit Service or Fitbit Content”).  
 20.  Darin Bartholomew, Deere & Co., Long Comment Regarding a Proposed Exemption 
Under 17 U.S.C. 1201, COPYRIGHT OFFICE 2 (Mar. 3, 2016), http://bit.do/CommentJohnDeere 
[hereinafter John Deere Comment] (“For example, in the absence of TPMs third-party software 
developers could purchase vehicles to access instantly copyrighted, safe and regulatory-
compliant software that is the result of years of extensive research and development by 
manufacturers and suppliers.”). 
 21.  EFF Wins Petition to Inspect and Modify Car Software, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION (Oct. 27, 2015), http://bit.do/EFFWinsPetition; Declan McCullagh, Lexmark 
invokes DMCA in toner suit, CNET (Jan. 9, 2003), http://bit.do/LexmarkInvokesDCMA (“Printer 
maker Lexmark has found an unusual weapon to thwart rivals from selling replacement toner 
cartridges: the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.”). 
 22.  James Grimmelmann, Harry Potter and the Mysterious Defeat Device, SLATE (Sept. 
22, 2015), http://bit.do/VolkswagenEmission (“[T]ech companies try to use copyright threats 
under the DMCA to shut it down, keeping the security community in the dark about 
vulnerabilities in the devices we use every day.”). 
 23.  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (“No person shall circumvent a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”). 
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I.  PRIVACY AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
A. The Reidentification Problem 
U.S. privacy regulation is built on the belief that data 
anonymization—removal of personally identifying information 
(“PII”) such as someone’s name, address, social-security number, or 
telephone number24—ensures privacy.25 U.S. federal and state laws 
carve out exceptions for entities that anonymize data.26 However, 
recent commentators have pointed out that technology and 
reidentification science have progressed to the point that 
anonymization alone can no longer protect privacy.27 With the advent 
of computers and the internet, more information is publicly available 
than ever before. With new reidentification techniques, seemingly-
unrelated online datasets can be linked together to bring an adversary 
closer to identifying you and information about you.28 An adversary29 
can now use information “nobody would classify as personally 
identifiable” to link data to your identity.30 
For example, when Netflix, the movie streaming and rental 
company, decided to publish anonymous movie ratings of its users as 
part of a competition to improve its recommendation algorithm,31 no 
one was too concerned about privacy. However, only two weeks after 
the release, researchers discovered that they could use public movie 
ratings on IMDB, coupled with Netflix’s published data, to identify 
users in the anonymized Netflix database, including movie 
preferences these users probably did not want publicized.32 The 
researchers also explained that, with only a little bit of knowledge 
about an individual subscriber, one could identify him or her in the 
database and find out all of their movie ratings.33 
The Netflix example demonstrates that researchers can find 
unique fingerprints in even the most innocuous data sets, and can 
combine two or more sets of “anonymized” data to identify people 
 
 24. Peppet, supra note 3, at 131. 
 25. Ohm, supra note 13, at 1703–04. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1704. 
 28. Id. at 1749. 
 29. Id. at 1707–08 (“A person, known in the scientific literature as an adversary, 
reidentifies anonymized data by linking anonymized records to outside information, hoping to 
discover the true identity of the data subjects.”). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Ohm, supra note 13, at 1720. 
 32. Id. at 1722. 
 33. Id. at 1721. 
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with surprising precision.34 All reidentification events, no matter how 
seemingly trivial, increase the linkability of data, exposing people to 
potential future harm.35 With the rise of blogs and social media, 
“[n]ever before in human history has it been so easy to peer into the 
private diaries of so many people.”36 The combination of the 
availability of the information, the ease of reidentification,37 and the 
great financial incentive to reidentify,38 means that most techniques of 
data anonymization—which simply remove personally identifying 
information (“PII”)—are doomed to fail.39  
B. IoT Devices Pose Even Greater Risks 
Sensor-based IoT devices exacerbate the issues addressed above. 
In general, sensors such as those in cars and on wearable devices 
enable continuous monitoring and collect a rich variety of data.40 
Most new cars in the U.S. have a “black box” that measures “a 
vehicle’s speed, how far the accelerator pedal is pressed, whether the 
brake is applied, whether the driver is using a seat belt, crash details, 
and other information, including, in some cases, the driver’s steering 
input and occupant sizes and seat positions.”41 Wearable sensors can 
collect even more sensitive information: steps taken, quality of sleep, 
skin temperature, breathing patterns, and heart rate, just to name a 
few.42 And because these devices contain complex, multi-faceted 
measurement sensors such as gyroscopes and accelerometers,43 even 
more sensitive information can be mined from the combination of the 
raw data outputs via sensor-fusion.44 For example, researchers have 
found that emotional or mental states can be derived from such data.45 
The data may even be used to predict behavior and infer personal 
habits.46  
But it is not just the sensitivity of the data or the continuous 
monitoring of IoT sensors that renders them particularly troubling. On 
 
 34. Id. at 1723. 
 35. Id. at 1746. 
 36. Id. at 1725. 
 37. Ohm, supra note 13, at 1731. 
 38. Id. at 1730. 
 39. Id. at 1732. 
 40. Peppet, supra note 3, at 88, 91. 
 41. Id. at 91. 
 42. Id. at 100–01. 
 43. Id. at 121. 
 44. Id. at 120–21 (“Sensor fusion is the combining of sensor data from different sources 
to create a resulting set of information that is better than if the information is used separately.”). 
 45. Id. at 121. 
 46. Peppet, supra note 3, at 122–23. 
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top of all this, reidentification is even easier for sensor data than for 
other types of data.47 This is because “sensor data capture such a rich 
picture of an individual, with so many related activities, that each 
individual in a sensor-based dataset is reasonably unique.”48 A Fitbit’s 
raw output data may, without more, reveal the user’s gender, height, 
weight, and, of course, their unique gait.49 The data would also tell 
you if that person is taking a bus or riding a bike.50 If an adversary 
had all of Fitbit’s raw data—anonymized but categorized by user—
and knew just a small amount more about a specific individual from 
another source—for example that this person rode the bus at a 
specific time—they would be able to figure out which raw data 
matches that person, and would thus know all their other Fitbit 
information (i.e., all their other movements).51 
With the enormous possibility for reidentification and the rich 
amount of data an adversary would have upon reidentification, it is 
crucial that users know what data their wearable sensors collect and 
how it is being used and sold. As discussed in more detail in 
Subsection C, if such data is used by employers or insurance 
companies to differentiate between individuals, it is also important 
that people have the ability to correct or dispute the data that is being 
collected.  
Despite the sensitivity of the data and the increased possibility of 
reidentification, most IoT companies’ privacy policies and consent 
procedures are inadequate. One commentator, Professor Scott Peppet, 
surveyed twenty popular IoT consumer devices, including Fitbit, and 
revealed some of these problems.52 Generally, the IoT wearable 
devices surveyed had no means of displaying privacy notices.53 Nor 
did any of the devices include privacy or data information in the 
box.54 Evidently, consumers may have to rely on the website or phone 
app of the device to provide the privacy policy.55 However, Peppet 
also found it difficult to locate the policies even from these sources.56 
In addition, when policies were finally located, they were generally 
 
 47. Id. at 129. Note that IoT devices also have various data security issues that may result 
in inadvertent data leaks, id. at 132–39, but those are beyond the scope of this article. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Peppet, supra note 3, at 129–30. 
 52. Id. at 140. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 141. 
 56. Id. at 141–42. 
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vague or ambiguous.57 What constitutes personal information, what 
data is sold and in what form, ownership of the data, and breach 
notification policies were generally poorly explained.58 Peppet also 
discovered that it was not usually possible to export raw data from the 
sensors, nor was it clear if users have modification or deletion rights, 
or what data is transmitted to and stored on company servers.59 Thus, 
although these devices collect extremely sensitive data, which poses a 
greater risk of reidentification, users are often denied even the most 
basic explanation of what data is collected and how it is used.  
C. Privacy Regulation of IoT Devices 
Given the aforementioned risks with data collection by IoT 
devices, it is troubling to think that these devices are out of reach of 
most current federal privacy regulations.60 First, U.S. privacy 
regulation generally focuses on whether PII is collected and disclosed 
by an entity.61 Thus, an IoT device company does not have to worry 
about reidentification problems under current privacy laws—simply 
removing fields such as the name and address from their data 
provides them a safe harbor to sell the data to third parties. 
In addition, most notice-and-consent requirements for companies 
rely on self-regulation, and have had only limited success due to the 
lack of government enforcement.62 The Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) has been getting complaints of inadequate self-regulation for 
some time.63 However, the FTC cannot typically enforce proper 
privacy notices unless they are deceptive or the company otherwise 
injured consumers in ways that violate public policy.64  
Furthermore, consumer fitness devices are not considered 
“medical devices,” and are thus not regulated by the FDA.65 The 
 
 57. Peppet, supra note 3, at 142. 
 58. Id. at 143–44. 
 59. Id. at 144–45. 
 60. See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 13, at 1704. 
 61. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept 
of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011). 
 62. See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary But Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for 
Privacy Notice and Choice, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 295 (2012) (discussing 
general failure of “industry disclosure schemes”). 
 63. See FTC STAFF, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED 
WORLD, FTC STAFF REP. 24 n.104 (Jan. 2015), http://bit.do/FTCIoT2015 [hereinafter 2015 
FTC REPORT] (quoting one participant as saying “That’s why I think vanilla self-regulatory 
efforts are probably not the answer. You need to have something that is enforced by an 
independent body….”); 2012 FTC REPORT, supra note 12, at 27. 
 64. Peppet, supra note 3, at 136 (discussing the jurisdictional limitations of the FTC). 
 65. Heather Patterson, Contextual Expectations of Privacy in Self-Generated Health 
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) also 
does not apply to devices such as Fitbit because the data is not 
collected by “covered entities,” such as health care providers.66 Nor 
do these devices collect “health information” created by a health 
provider.67 In addition, even if HIPAA were to somehow apply, HHS 
regulations provide an exemption if data is anonymized through 
removal of identifiers such as the name and address.68 With the 
problem of reidentification addressed above, this exemption provides 
little consolation to users. 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) also provides only 
limited protection. If IoT device manufacturers provide data to credit 
companies, insurance agencies, or potential employers, they would be 
regulated by the FCRA.69 In this case, the device company would be 
classified as a “consumer reporting agency,” and consumers would 
have the right to dispute the accuracy or completeness of any such 
report.70 The FCRA still leaves a gap, however. As one commentator 
explains, “a lender, insurer, or employer doing its own analysis of 
sensor data would not trigger the FCRA’s CRA-related 
requirements.”71 Thus, if your current or potential employer simply 
asked for your Fitbit data, no privacy regulation would protect your 
rights.72 This is not an unrealistic hypothetical. Large employers seem 
to have developed a habit of collecting very sensitive data from 
employees, sometimes even charging fines to those who do not 
comply.73 In particular, certain employers have recently started 
distributing Fitbits to employees, providing financial incentives for 
those who wear them and meet certain fitness goals.74  
Users’ inability to know what data is being collected or to 
challenge its accuracy has taken on even greater importance with the 
advent of IoT devices. At the same time, privacy regulation lags 
 
Information Flows 20 (June 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript, N.Y.U. MEDIA, CULTURE, & 
COMM. INFO. L. INST.) http://bit.do/PattersonPrivacy. 
 66. See id. at 17; 45 C.F.R. § 160.102.  
 67. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102. 
 68. Id. § 164.514(b)(2). 
 69. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1). 
 70. Id. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). 
 71. Peppet, supra note 3, at 127. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 118 (“In March 2013, for example, CVS Pharmacy announced that employees 
must submit information about their weight, body fat composition, and other personal health 
metrics on a monthly basis or pay a monthly fine.”). 
 74. Parmy Olson, Fitbit On Track To Sell Thousands More Devices Through Barclays, 
GoDaddy And Other Employers, FORBES (Oct. 20, 2015), 
http://bit.do/ForbesFitbitSellThousands.  
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behind, focusing on outdated definitions of PII, relying on company 
self-regulation, and leaving consumers to fend for themselves with 
employers. Current copyright law only further muddies the waters. 
II. DMCA AND IOT 
A. DMCA Anti-Circumvention Provisions 
Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA)75 in 1998 to implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty.76 
Section 1201 of the DMCA prohibits circumvention of “a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under this title.”77 The Act defines circumvention as “to 
descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or 
otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a 
technological measure, without the authority of the copyright 
owner.”78 Since IoT devices often use technological measures79 such 
as passwords and encryption to protect copyrightable works—the 
underlying software and data outputs,80 for instance—the DMCA has 
direct implications for users attempting to hack their own devices.  
From the plain reading of the anti-circumvention provision, it is 
clear that circumvention of a technological measure alone is an 
actionable offense, even if that circumvention does not involve 
copyright infringement.81 What is less clear is whether circumventing 
a technological protection measure needs to have some relationship to 
copyright infringement.82 This question is important because it 
determines what a plaintiff needs to show to bring a DMCA claim,83 
and the extent that device manufacturers can use copyright 
protections to completely control the use, repair, and alteration of 
their devices.84 
 
 75. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 76. Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 521 (1999). 
 77. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).  
 78. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A). 
 79. See infra note 97.  
 80. See infra note 100. 
 81. 3-12A MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.03 
(2015) (“The basic provision… is equivalent to breaking into a castle—the invasion of another’s 
property is itself the offense…. Note that the gravamen here is not copyright infringement, but 
instead something that can be labeled ‘paracopyright.’”). 
 82. Megan M. Chung, Does Liability under the DMCA Require a Showing of Nexus to 
Copyright Infringement?, 22 INTELL. PROP. LITIG. 14 (Spring 2011). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Daniel C. Higgs, Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. 
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Circuits have split on whether the anti-circumvention provision 
needs to have some connection to copyright infringement.85 The 
Federal Circuit has expressed concerns that completely dissociating 
the DMCA from copyright infringement would have disastrous 
effects for users: 
Under [this regime]…, the owners of a work protected by both 
copyright and a technological measure that effectively controls 
access to that work per § 1201(a) would possess unlimited rights 
to hold circumventors liable under § 1201(a) merely for accessing 
that work, even if that access enabled only rights that the 
Copyright Act grants to the public…. In a similar vein, [this] 
construction would allow any manufacturer of any product to add 
a single copyrighted sentence or software fragment to its product, 
wrap the copyrighted material in a trivial “encryption” scheme, 
and thereby gain the right to restrict consumers’ rights to use its 
products in conjunction with competing products.86  
The Sixth Circuit shares the Federal Circuit’s sentiment,87 if not its 
solution to the problem.88 
The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, believes that reading an 
“infringement nexus”89 into the DMCA is “contrary to the plain 
language of the statute” and that the Federal Circuit’s policy concerns 
“are best directed to Congress in the first instance.”90 The Ninth 
Circuit explains that the DMCA § 1201(a) “creates a new anti-
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that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords 
copyright owners.”). 
 90. Blizzard, 629 F.3d at 950. 
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circumvention right distinct from copyright infringement.”91 The 
court believes that Congress intended to create a new right by 
pointing to the language and legislative history of the statute.92 For 
example, the House Commerce Report proposed moving the new 
DMCA provisions entirely outside of Title 17 because “these 
regulatory provisions have little, if anything, to do with copyright 
law.”93 In addition, the fact that Congress granted the Library of 
Congress the power to create temporary exemptions for the anti-
circumvention provisions seems to indicate that Congress was trying 
“balance copyright owners’ new anti-circumvention right with the 
public’s right to access the work.”94 Finally, though the Ninth Circuit 
did not address this, during the House Commerce Committee’s 
Congressional hearings on the DMCA, several commentators 
proposed narrowing the anti-circumvention provisions to include 
some reference to infringement.95 The fact that Congress chose not to 
act on these proposals is telling in and of itself. 
Even if the DMCA does contemplate an infringement nexus for 
circumvention, that nexus may not be so difficult to meet. As 
Lawrence Lessig elegantly put it:  
Digital technology, at its core, makes copies. Copies are to digital 
life as breathing is to our physical life. There is no way to use any 
content in a digital context without that use producing a copy. 
When you read a book stored on your computer, you make a copy 
(at least in the RAM memory to page through the book). When 
you do anything with digital content, you technically produce a 
copy.96 
Thus, if you hack a wearable device to look at its data output, you are 
likely infringing and violating the DMCA. Most data and software on 
these devices are encrypted or protected by other TPMs97 which 
 
 91. Id. at 948. 
 92. Id. at 943–48. 
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means you would have to overcome these measures to gain access to 
the data, i.e. you have to circumvent the technological measures.98 
Any manipulation of the software or data of the device will inevitably 
mean you are making unauthorized copies.99 And since software and 
data output can be copyright-protected,100 you may be infringing on 
the manufacturer’s copyright.  
In any case, the ambiguity in copyright law about whether the 
DMCA includes an infringement nexus itself serves to primarily 
benefit copyright owners. At best, if a nexus is required, a user who 
hacked their own device for privacy reasons can attempt to argue fair 
use, a notoriously unpredictable argument in court.101 At worst, if the 
court does not require an infringement nexus, the user must hope for 
the court to otherwise interpret the DMCA’s anti-circumvention 
provision in the user’s favor. In the end, a pending lawsuit and the 
uncertainty of outcome may pressure many users into settling, 
licensing, or simply not even accessing the copyrighted work to avoid 
court costs.102  
Litigation is likely because manufacturers of devices have 
enormous incentives to keep you from being freely able to manipulate 
your devices. Knowing the software or data output of a device can 
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allow you to reverse-engineer the device. Thus, TPMs, by blocking 
access to the software and data, are used to protect the intellectual 
property underlying the device. TPMs also give manufacturers total 
control over how you use the device. They can keep you from 
repairing or altering it, as car manufacturers have done.103 They can 
limit what applications run on it, as Apple has done with its tablets 
and phones.104  
These are not just abstract hypotheticals. Ford Motors recently 
sued a car equipment company, Autel, under the DMCA for hacking 
Ford’s diagnostic software and copying Ford’s proprietary database of 
vehicle parts.105 Autel created an independent diagnostic tool for 
repairing Ford vehicles that competed with Ford’s built-in software.106 
Although the district court dismissed the DMCA claim because Ford 
“d[id] not allege that [it] owned a copyright on its data compilation at 
the time when the alleged circumvention of its technological security 
measures took place,”107 it is clearly a claim that Ford thought it could 
otherwise win. 
The fact that the Library of Congress has recently passed an 
exemption to the anti-circumvention provisions allowing users to 
circumvent the TPMs in their cars and medical devices only further 
proves that the anti-circumvention provisions may otherwise have 
been used by manufacturers against such acts.108 During the comment 
period, car manufacturers strongly opposed this exemption, claiming 
that vehicle owners don’t actually own but only license their vehicle’s 
software,109 and that circumvention would allow “for pirates, third-
party software developers, and less innovative competitors to free-
ride off the creativity, unique expression and ingenuity of vehicle 
software designed by leading vehicle manufacturers and their 
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suppliers.”110 Medical device manufacturers opposed circumvention 
of medical devices, even if it only allowed people to access their own 
device’s data output.111 Both car and medical device manufacturers 
also pointed to other regulatory schemes that are better suited to deal 
with how these devices operate and collect data.112 However, the 
Copyright Office, in making its exemption recommendation to the 
Library of Congress, pointed out that “it is inescapable that the anti-
circumvention prohibition in section 1201(a)(1) plays a role in th[is] 
debate.”113  
B. DMCA, Privacy, and IoT Devices 
As currently drafted, the DMCA does not allow for 
circumvention of our own, legally-purchased IoT devices for privacy 
reasons. The DMCA drafters considered the impact of the statute on 
privacy. However, as this section will explain, the DMCA’s attempt 
to address privacy is of limited utility to users concerned about how 
device manufacturers are collecting and using their collected data.  
The DMCA contains a savings clause that directly addressed 
privacy concerns: 
Nothing in this chapter abrogates, diminishes, or weakens the 
provisions of, nor provides any defense or element of mitigation 
in a criminal prosecution or civil action under, any Federal or 
State law that prevents the violation of the privacy of an 
individual in connection with the individual’s use of the 
internet.114 
 
 110. John Deere Comment, supra note 20, at 2.  
 111. AdvaMed Comment, supra note 97, at 2 (“We believe that patients have the inherent 
right to access their own medical data, however this in and of itself does not necessitate bypass 
of any intellectual property protections.”). 
 112. Id. at 7 (“In view of the profound risks associated with unauthorized circumvention, 
we strongly believe that the Copyright Office should confer with FDA and defer to its views in 
this matter, as FDA is the federal agency charged with assuring the safety, efficacy and security 
of medical devices.”); Auto Alliance Comment, supra note 109, at 21 (“We urge the Copyright 
Office to give full consideration to the impacts on critical national energy and environmental 
goals, and on motor vehicle safety, in its decision on this proposed exemption.”); John Deere 
Comment, supra note 20, at 4 (“Further, the Register is encouraged to consult with other federal 
government agencies, including the EPA, as part of the rulemaking process prior to deciding the 
outcome of Proposed Class 21.”). 
 113. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING: SIXTH TRIENNIAL 
PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE EXEMPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION, 
RECOMMENDATION OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 316 (Oct. 2015), 
http://bit.do/RegistersRecommendation [hereinafter 2015 COPYRIGHT OFFICE RULEMAKING 
RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
 114. 17 U.S.C. § 1205.  
106 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 33 
As one commentator has pointed out, however, this vague savings 
provision recognizes that the DMCA may create new privacy issues 
but offers no solutions.115 
The DMCA also contains a number of exemptions from its anti-
circumvention provisions.116 These exemptions are too narrowly-
tailored, however, to allow for circumvention due to privacy 
concerns. A user circumventing a device to figure out what data is 
being collected is not doing “encryption research” or trying to achieve 
interoperability.117 Perhaps such circumvention may be considered 
“security testing” because users are accessing a “computer” to 
investigate “a security flaw” with “the authorization of the owner.”118 
But is the circumvention of software on a device the same as 
accessing a “computer”?119 Also, is the user the “owner” of that 
software?120  
And what if a government agency wants to figure out if a device 
is improperly collecting data in violation of our privacy? Although the 
“law enforcement” exception, § 1201(e),121 exempts investigative 
activity of government agents from the anticircumvention provision, 
it again can only be carried out “in order to identify and address the 
vulnerabilities of a government computer, computer system, or 
computer network.”122 Just as with the “security testing” exemption, it 
is not clear if circumventing software of an IoT device is within the 
scope of this narrow language. 
The DMCA exemptions also address privacy violations 
explicitly, noting that conduct related to these exemptions that 
violates privacy is prohibited.123 This language is plainly of no 
assistance to users desiring to circumvent their own devices as it only 
further limits the permissible scope of circumvention. It appears that 
the DMCA drafters believed that the best security for our privacy is 
the protection of devices using TPMs.124 Unfortunately, although 
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TPMs protect our device information from being hacked by third 
parties, they also shield data collection and usage by device 
manufacturers.  
The DMCA contains an explicit provision, § 1201(i), that allows 
for circumvention of TPMs to protect PII. Unfortunately, this 
provision is extremely narrow in scope. First, it only allows for 
circumvention when the TPM “contains the capability of collecting or 
disseminating personally identifying information reflecting the online 
activities of a natural person who seeks to gain access to the work 
protected.”125 In other words, this provision is concerned with internet 
cookies on your browser,126 not IoT devices. Second, circumvention is 
only allowed to disable the cookie, and only when the TPM does not 
provide “conspicuous notice” and an opt-out option for data 
collection.127 This provision simply provides an incentive for cookie 
software manufacturers to provide notice and opt-out options to users, 
and is not a true “exemption” to the anti-circumvention provision.128 
In sum, the provision only addresses an outdated issue of internet 
cookies and uses the vestigial concept of PII, without defining the 
term, let alone addressing re-identification problems. The limited 
scope of this provision prompted one commentator to note that “[t]he 
most plausible explanation for the specific provisions relating to 
online activities is simply that interest groups brought these problems 
to the drafting committees’ attention.”129 
In recognition that this rapidly-changing field would require 
regulatory flexibility, Congress provided the Library of Congress with 
the power to create three-year exceptions to the anti-circumvention 
provision.130 Nevertheless, the most recent Library of Congress 
exemptions also do not allow circumvention for privacy reasons, nor 
do they address the privacy concerns associated with wearable 
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devices.131 Although privacy issues were raised by interested parties 
in comments submitted for rulemaking, the Copyright Office did not 
mention privacy as a primary reason for allowing circumvention,132 
and none of these concerns made it into the final regulatory text.133 
III.   PROPOSAL 
Wearable IoT devices have fallen into a regulatory gap within 
privacy law. At the same time, manufacturers of these devices have 
great financial incentives to collect, use, and sell the data their devices 
collect. The DMCA allows manufacturers to prohibit users and 
government investigators from accessing the data these devices 
collect, without any exceptions for privacy. This seems to be a 
situation of foxes guarding a henhouse. How can we properly police 
device manufacturers? Is self-regulation really enough? Or, in the 
alternative, is it realistic to rely completely on regulatory agencies to 
find privacy violations in consumer products? All these questions 
indicate that some sort of amendment to the DMCA may be 
necessary. 
A.  Option 1: Add an Infringement Nexus to the Anti-
Circumvention Provision 
If the DMCA anti-circumvention provision is amended to 
require copyright infringement for liability, then perhaps users can 
circumvent their devices and argue that their conduct was fair use. 
Although this amendment would disentangle some of the privacy 
issues currently mixed in with copyright law by the DMCA, this type 
of amendment has several disadvantages. First, fair use is an uncertain 
standard.134 Litigants thus have little guidance about what conduct 
will be deemed appropriate before they show up in court.  
Second, it is not clear how anti-circumvention should be tied to 
infringement in the statute. Should it be tied to intent to infringe?135 
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This would involve a difficult evidentiary analysis of scienter. Or 
perhaps the statute should attempt to incorporate the Federal Circuit’s 
idea “that 17 U.S.C. § 1201 prohibits only forms of access that bear a 
reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act 
otherwise affords copyright owners.”136 In other words, the DMCA 
would prohibit circumvention only where some exclusive right of the 
copyright owner were trespassed.137 However, putting vague 
standards such as “reasonable relationship” into the statute may not 
help resolve ambiguities in the law. And this would again involve 
issues of why someone accessed a work, not just the fact that they did, 
complicating enforcement. 
Lastly, this amendment is entirely too broad, further reducing the 
chance that Congress would ever pass it. The amendment would not 
only deal with privacy, but would completely revolutionize the 
DMCA. Congress had proposals such as the ones above in front of it 
when drafting the statute.138 Yet Congress decided to instead create a 
new right for copyright owners, separate from copyright 
infringement.139 Maybe Congress is ready to scrap the DMCA due to 
the technological progress that has occurred since the original bill was 
drafted in 1998, but there are more realistic, narrowly-tailored 
solutions to deal with the privacy issues addressed in this article. 
B.  Option 2: Repeal § 1201(i)  
Repealing § 1201(i) may allow Congress to send a clearer 
message that the DMCA has no impact on privacy rights and that 
other regulatory mechanisms can ensure manufacturer compliance 
with disclosure, transparency, and consent without the need for 
circumvention. This repeal would not be a big change for the DMCA 
considering the limited relevance of § 1201(i) due to its narrow scope 
and out-of-date conceptualization.140  
However, privacy regulation cannot be effective if the DMCA 
provides no clear exception to circumvention for privacy. The DMCA 
creates a complete lack of transparency. Only device manufacturers 
know what data is collected and how it is used. Government agencies 
are in the dark, and so are users.141 This puts the DMCA in tension 
with the goals of many privacy regulations, such as those that allow 
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consumers to dispute reports provided to insurance companies and 
employers.142 How can agencies tasked with protecting consumer 
privacy investigate these devices without the ability to circumvent 
them?143 Simply repealing § 1201(i) will not resolve any of these 
issues. 
C.  Option 3: Update and Broaden § 1201(i) and § 1201(e) 
The DMCA anticircumvention provision has tangled copyright 
issues with privacy law in a way that needs to be addressed explicitly. 
Thus, the privacy exception, § 1201(i), and the law enforcement 
exception, § 1201(e), need to be updated and broadened to allow for 
proper regulation of privacy. The new exceptions need to be flexible 
to allow for technological change. They also need to be clearly 
defined to prevent abuse. Finally, the government’s chief privacy 
agency, the FTC, needs to have a greater role in the enforcement of 
those provisions. The Library of Congress is utterly lacking in 
expertise in this space.  
It may be possible to convince Congress to amend § 1201(i). 
Legislative history indicates that Congress had broader privacy 
concerns in mind when drafting the DMCA, but may have simply 
been unable to predict subsequent technological developments. For 
example, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary explained that the 
savings clause in the DMCA was drafted to prevent parties from 
relying on the DMCA’s anticircumvention provision “to make it 
harder, rather than easier, to protect personal privacy on the internet” 
in a scenario where “existing or future technologies …evolve[d] in 
such a way that an individual would have to circumvent a 
technological protection measure to protect his or her privacy.”144 In 
proposing § 1201(i), the House Committee on Commerce noted that 
“in reaching to protect the rights of copyright owners, Congress need 
not encroach upon the privacy interests of consumers.”145 Thus, 
Congress may be amenable to updating § 1201(i) to protect privacy. 
1. The New § 1201(i) Privacy Exception 
The new § 1201(i) needs to strike a balance between 
incentivizing transparency for manufacturers but preventing user 
abuse in the name of privacy. It is not enough for § 1201(i) to allow 
circumvention only when device manufacturers do not provide 
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conspicuous notice of data collection, however. There is no proper 
check on the manufacturers in this case—their notice may be 
inaccurate, and circumvention is the only way anyone can find out 
about their real practices. Giving all the power to device 
manufacturers, when they have strong incentives not to be 
forthright,146 is not a workable solution.  
It is also unrealistic for the government—the FTC, for 
example—to monitor all device data collection and dissemination 
practices without third party input. Even large device manufacturers 
and software companies often rely on outside hackers for input about 
data vulnerabilities.147 And the FTC has fewer resources and less 
expertise than some of these private companies do. In fact, there is 
evidence that the FTC already relies on private input when it comes to 
investigating inappropriate device collection by manufacturers.148 
Thus, some circumvention by private individuals needs to be allowed 
in order to properly police device manufacturers. 
Section 1201(i) should be amended to allow for good-faith 
circumvention of a user’s lawfully-purchased device to determine if 
data being collected is inconsistent with the context of the company’s 
relationship or interaction with the consumer.149 This “context of 
interaction” concept has been discussed by the FTC in two reports.150 
The concept addresses “the need for flexibility so that companies can 
tailor the[ir] choice options to specific business models and 
contexts.”151 In recognition of this need for flexibility, the FTC has 
mentioned that the timing and extent of disclosure and consent may 
vary depending on how the company uses the data and what type of 
data is collected.152 It may be impractical and unnecessary to provide 
for consumer choice before every single data collection event, 
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especially if the collection is consistent with user expectations.153 As 
detailed in the next section dealing with the law enforcement 
exception, the FTC can use rulemaking to define the parameters of 
this “context of interaction” standard and to specify new industry 
norms, while still leaving room for innovation.154  
The new § 1201(i) exception could be limited in several ways to 
prevent abuse in the name of privacy. For instance, it would only 
allow circumvention of one’s own device, not general trafficking in 
technology that would allow others to circumvent.155 Effectively, 
circumvention would be open only to those users with the coding 
skills necessary to figure out what their own IoT device is doing (i.e., 
“white hat” hackers). In addition, the exception would require a “good 
faith” purpose for circumvention. New regulations or the revised 
language of § 1201(i) can further specify that the good faith purpose 
will only be presumed in court if the white hat hacker filed a report 
with the FTC about their findings. The hacker can report that he or 
she found no improper data collection or dissemination and would 
still be entitled to this rebuttable presumption.156  
 However, this presumption could be rebutted if the device 
manufacturer properly followed FTC disclosure and consent 
regulations, as detailed in the FTC’s new rulemaking.157 Thus, if the 
company already had a very detailed privacy policy and appeared 
transparent about data collection and use, there may have been less of 
a reason for a user to go digging into the hardware and software of the 
device. In sum, this exception would provide an incentive for 
manufacturer transparency and limit circumvention to good faith 
purposes by sophisticated coders. 
2. Expanded § 1201(e) Law Enforcement Exception 
To complement the new privacy exception above, the law 
enforcement exception, § 1201(e), needs to be broadened to allow the 
FTC to investigate whether data collection or dissemination by an IoT 
device manufacturer is inconsistent with the context of the company’s 
 
 153. 2015 FTC REPORT, supra note 63, at 40–41, 43. 
 154. Id. at 43. 
 155. See 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(2) (“No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, 
provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part 
thereof, that is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title….”). 
 156. Users may need additional immunity if device manufacturers bring contract lawsuits 
against them for breaching the terms of service. This is beyond the scope of this article, 
however.  
 157. See infra Part III.C.2. 
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relationship with the consumer. Since enforcement by a government 
agency is less open to abuse and requires more flexibility, this 
exception may allow FTC agents not only the right to circumvent 
devices but also the right to traffic in circumvention technologies. 
With this expanded exception, the FTC can properly respond to third 
party tips as it sees fit. 
The recent attempt by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to force 
Apple to hack the San Bernadino shooter’s iPhone158 (“the Apple 
case”) does reveal additional concerns that any new expansion of 
government power in this area needs to address. The suggested 
revision to the law enforcement exception is not intended to provide a 
route for government agencies to force device manufacturers to create 
deliberate, back-door access to their devices for investigative 
purposes. This type of government power may lead to reduced 
effectiveness of existing encryption mechanisms and hinder personal 
privacy. The goal of this proposal is to provide increased transparency 
of the use of data by device manufacturers, while minimizing any 
unintended effects on personal privacy.  
To avoid the potential use of the All Writs Act159 by a court of 
law—as the DOJ attempted to do with Apple—the law enforcement 
exception should mimic the limitations of the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)160 at issue in the 
Apple case. As Professor Nunziato explained in a recent article,161 
CALEA does not allow a court to invoke the All Writs Act to force 
Apple to create a back door to its encryption.162 In enacting CALEA, 
Congress expressly stipulated that the Act “does not authorize any 
law enforcement agency or officer— to require any specific design of 
equipment … to be adopted by any provider of a wire or electronic 
communication service….”163 This explicit limitation, Nunziato 
posits, protects manufacturers against government use of the All 
Writs Act because “courts cannot rely on the [All Writs] Act to issue 
an order that is explicitly or implicitly prohibited under a federal 
statute”164 Thus, a similar limitation in the proposed law enforcement 
 
 158. Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, Apple Fights Order to Unlock San Bernardino 
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 159. 28 U.S.C. § 1651. 
 160. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1001. 
 161. Dawn Carla Nunziato, Code Free or Die: Apple’s Flawed First Amendment Defense 
to the Government’s Order Compelling Apple to Write Computer Code to Defeat iPhones’ 
Security Features (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 162. Id. at 7. 
 163. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1)). 
 164. Id. at 6.  
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exception to the DMCA may be necessary to prevent government use 
of the statute for unintended purposes.  
Aside from the concerns brought to light in the Apple case, the 
statutory exception should be broadly-worded to allow flexibility for 
the rapid technological changes occurring in this area. To that end, the 
DMCA exception needs to grant the FTC substantive rulemaking 
authority to define what it means for data collection and 
dissemination to be inconsistent with the context of the company’s 
relationship with the consumer.165 The FTC can use this power to 
develop context-specific industry standards of disclosure, consent, 
and user access to data that are in line with other privacy regulations 
already in place. The new regulations can also help steer privacy law 
to concepts beyond PII, for example, by developing a flexible 
standard that considers whether the person involved is identified or 
identifiable, and with the latter, the risk of re-identification.166 In 
addition to rulemaking, the FTC also has expertise in providing 
guidance and developing data security industry standards through its 
enforcement actions.167 Under this proposal, the FTC can use 
rulemaking and enforcement actions to align the DMCA with the 
goals underlying our privacy laws—providing “notice and consent, 
access, data integrity, enforcement, and remedies”168—while pushing 
this area of the law in the direction of much-needed updates.  
CONCLUSION 
Our IoT devices are constantly monitoring our every move, 
collecting sensitive data about us in a way that we do not fully 
appreciate. The companies manufacturing these devices have a huge 
financial incentive to collect as much data as they can, and to use and 
sell this data in its most identifiable form. Yet the DMCA and our 
current privacy regulations provide no real checks on the conduct of 
these companies. The DMCA anticircumvention provision prevents 
users and the government from ever finding out what data is collected 
and how it used by device manufacturers. To create some 
transparency in this system, Congress must amend the DMCA to 
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 166. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 61, at 1877–79 (discussing a new standard for PII 
that takes into account re-identification potential of digital data). 
 167. See generally Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC 
Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 (2015) (discussing FTC authority and common 
law rulemaking in the privacy and data security space). 
 168. Ohm, supra note 13, at 1734; see also Schwartz & Solove, supra note 61, at 1824–25 
(discussing the listed Fair Information Practices as “the building blocks of modern information 
privacy law”). 
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include a limited circumvention exception for privacy. The proposed 
exception attempts to incentivize above-board behavior by device 
manufacturers, while allowing the government’s chief privacy 
agency, the FTC, to have the tools and resources required to 
investigate improper practices at its disposal. The FTC can help create 
binding industry standards for data collection and dissemination, 
aligning the DMCA with the goals in our privacy regulations and 
filling in the regulatory gaps our current privacy laws leave for IoT 
device manufacturers. 
 
